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Little evidence  exists  on the distribution  across  * The global  trend  has been toward an in-
countries  of toxic releases  by manufacturing,  or  creasingly  emission-intensive  pattern of produc-
on how those patterns  change  through  time.  tion, in relation  to both manufacturing  and to
GDP. This trend has been remarkably  constant
A number  of studies have  asked whether  over three decades  and shows  no signs of
environmental  controls  imposed  in the industrial-  slowing.
ized economies  are diverting  investments  in
pollution-intensive  activities  offshore.  These  * The upward  tiend in emission-intensity  of
studies reach a broad negative  conclusion:  direct  manufacturing  production  has been faster among
investment  does  not appear  to be stimulated  by  lower-income  nations.  If pollution  restraints  on
such regulation,  in part because  the cost of  given  industries  are progressing  more rapidly
emission  controls  is generally  a tiny fraction  of  among  the wealthier  countries,  this disparity
operating  costs.  would  be even sharper  than the Bank data
suggest.
But direct investment  reflects  only part  of
what may be happening  to world  production  . Developing  countries  that produce  coal,
patterns.  Technology  transfers  may  occur with  crude  oil, or natural  gas also have more  pollu-
no simultaneous  direct investment,  and produc-  tion-intensive  manufacturing  sectors, based on
tion may readily  shift toward a different  global  the availability  of those raw materials.  It may be
distribution  without  either direct investment  or  doubted  that fostering  such industries  always
technology  transfer.  reflects a comparative  advantage.  Petrochemical
industries  in the coal-oil-gas-producing  countries
Lucas  presents the evidence  on the vworld  are often substantially  protected  or subsidized.
distribution  of manufacturing  production  acord-
ing to pollution  density  - using  data from the  * Among all developing  countries,  import
World  Bank Industrial  Pollution  Projections  protection  stimulates  a larger  chemicals  industry
Team. He then examines  the validity  of the claim  and thus more  emission-intensive  manufacturing.
that free trade would result  in greater and more  One might  guess that less protection  of local
rapid  enviromnental  degradation  for developing  industrial  chemical  industries  would  decrease  the
countries.  He finds that:  pollution-intensity  of the developing  countries'
industry.  But merely relocating  firns that emit
- The onus is on the higher-income  countries  globally  damaging  toxins  clearly misses  the
to contain  the emissions  of their increasingly  point.
pollution-oriented  mix of manufacturing  indus-
tries.
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Little  evidence exists  on  the  distribution across  countries of  toxic  releases  by
manufacturirng,  or on how those patterns are changing  through  time.  A number  of studies have
asked whe.her environmental controls imposed in the industrialized  economies are diverting
investments in pollution intensive activities off-shore.'  In broad terms these studies reach a
negative conclusion: direct investment  does not appear to be stimulated  by such regulation, in
part because the cost of emission controls is generally  a tiny fraction of operating costs.  Yet
direct investment reflects only a portion of what may  be happening  to world production  patterns;
technology transfers may occur with no simultaneous  direct investment and production may
readily shift toward a different  global  distribution  without  either direct investment  or technology
transfer.
Consequently,  this paper has a two-fold  purpose. The first is to present evidence on the
world  distribution of  manufacturing production according to  pollution intensity.  This
examination is made possible by the availability  of a new data source compiled by the World
Bank Industrial Pollution Projections  Team. These data are described briefly in Section I and
some results on estimated world patterns of toxic releases, and how these are changing  through
time, are presented in Section II.
The second is to examine the validity  of the claim that free trade would result in greater
and more rapid environmental  degradation  for developing  countries. Section  III considers some
of the issues surrounding  this idea and offers some empirical evidence from the manufacturing
sector.
I.  Data Sources and Limitations
The World Bank Industrial  Pollution  Projections  Team has compiled  intensities  of toxic
releases per dollar's worth of output in the USA, for every three digit -- and a selection  of four
digit -- industries on the International  Standard  Industrial  Classification. There are two primary
1. Dean (1991) offers a very useful survey of this material.
1data sources for these intensity measures. First, a sample of 15,000 plants is drawn from the
US Environmental Protection Agency Toxic Release Inventory; this latter reports air, water,
underground  and solid waste releases for 320 toxic substances. After matching  these data with
observations on  the same 15,000 plants from the US Census of Manufacturing, the second
primary source, emissions Der  unit of output are calculated.
The present paper focuses upon three intensity measures generated from the above
sources.  The first is the number of pounds  of all 320 toxic releases -- atmospheric,  effluent or
solid -- per dollar's worth of output. In Table 1, this measure is referred to as total emissions.
Clearly though, some  toxic wastes  are of greater concern than others. The USEPA consequentlv
assigns a risk index, ranging from 1 (low risk) through 4 (high risk), to each of the 320 toxic
substances monitored, according to  their threat to humans.  The second intensity measu;e,
compiled by the World Bank Industrial  Pollution Projections  Team, uses these risk factors as
weights  in a linear weighted  sum of toxic releases per dollar's worth of output.
The implicit assumption in such a measure is that the USEPA risk scale is inherently
linear; one pound of risk factor 4 emissions is presumed to be as damaging as four pounds of
risk factor 1 releases.  This assumption  may not be accurate.  Hence a third intensity measure
assigns  --  admittedly  somewhat arbitrarily  -- exponential  weights  to  the USEPA's  four  risk
factors (1, 10, 100 and 1000). In Table 1, the latter two measures  are referred to as the linear
and exponential intensities  respectively.
Two features of these intensity  measures  are woith noting  at the outset. First, the simple
(unweighted)  correlation of the three measures  is very high across industries:
Correlation Coefficients
Industry  Toxic Intensity
Linear Weights  Exponential  Weights
Total  0.995  0.944
Linear Weights  0.941
In other words, although the three measures  offer different representations  of toxic emission
2Table  I  Toxic Release Intensities by Manufacturing  Industries
Weighted  Risk Factor Industry  ISIC Code  !oS2  I,inear  Exponential
Food Products  3110  781.6  1418.0  20776.7
Beverages  3130  205.1  387.1  4647.5
Tobacco  3140  489.0  977.9  5308.9
Other Textile Production  3210  3502.2  6289.7  51086.7
Spinning, Weaving  3211  3106.7  7400.0  154381.3
Wearing Apparel  3220  1744.8  3341.8  17515.8
Leather & Products  3230  15380.7  25762.0  268922.3
Footwear  3240  2277.7  3324.0  11695.0
Wood Products  3310  4399.4  9247.0  137294.6
Furniture, Fixtures  3320  5366.8  10056.8  61291.0
Other Paper Products  3410  8741.7  16897.6  98109.5
Pulp, Paper  3411  6225.9  11720.6  116899.8
Printing, Publishing  3420  7513.9  14931.6  109252.0
Other Industrial Chemicals  3510  52260.3  105302.7  966600.0  E
Basic Industrial Chemicals  3511  32254.6  54922.9  609770.9
Synthetic Resins  3513  14002.9  26436.7  544602.8
Other Chemical Products  3520  3563.8  6582.8  58049.0
Drugs and Medicines  3522  3966.7  7416.5  42819.7
Petroleum Refineries  3530  3757.9  7669.5  78634.6
Petroleum & Coal Products  3540  2544.1  4777.4  29444.3
Rubber Products  3550  2934.2  5385.5  26305.2
Plastic Products n.e.c.  3560  9335.0  17310.5  175559.9
Pottery, China, etc.  3610  3614.5  5479.4  29164.7
Glass & Products  3620  1481.2  2893.2  43583.8
Non-Metal Prods. n.e.c.  3690  3853.8  5920.2  44194.1
Iron and Steel  3710  7642.8  12931.9  349897.7
Non-Ferrous MVetals  3720  9334.3  13234.7  151219.2
Metal Products  3810  4592.5  9103.6  166930.2
Other Machinery n.e.c.  3820  1596.2  2840.5  39165.8
Office & Computing  Machinery  3825  303.3  452.4  3163.4
Other Electrical Machinery  3830  1797.3  3195.2  38967.4
Radio, Television, etc.  3832  1808.3  3137.4  29207.4
Transport Equipment  3840  1007.8  2085.8  28055.7
Shipbuilding,  Repair  3841  2546.5  3743.2  17426.9
Motor Vehicles  3843  666.9  1188.4  15733.1
Professional  goods  3850  887.6  1576.5  16127.0
Other Industries  3900  2706.8  4679.0  42682.7
2. lbs. per million 1987 US dollars.
3intensities, their levels move quite closely together across the 37 industrial categolies. As a
result, most of the analysis  in this study  will focus upon total emissions  rather than risk-weighted
measures.
Th- second feature to note is that all three measures  peak for Industrial  Chemicals  (ISIC
codes 3510 and 3511).  This feature helps explain the high correlation  just noted; as discussed
later, it is also significant  in the context of protectionism  (see Section III).
The international  distribution of toxic emissions from manufacturing  is examined here
by applying the intensity measures from Table 1 to the mix of industrial outputs reported for
various countries. 3 This, of course, involves  certain assumptions,  irzcluding  the following:
* The application  of observed  US ei,iission  intensities  to other countries  assumes si  milar
technologies  and enforcement  standards  across countries. For instance, to the extent  that
lower income  countries  have  more pollution-intensive  techniques  for given industries  than
does the US (whether  because,  of the state  of know-how,  differing  regulations,  or greater
difficulty in enforcement),  the measures generated here understate toxic outputs from
lower income nations.  On the other hand, if emissions per unit of output are roughly
similar across countries, then the measures  provide a reasonable  approximation.
* Closely related to the above is an issue arising from the level of disaggregation
available in the industrial data.  The application of US intensities to other countries
assumes either that the pollution intensity  of various products within an industry group
are not too dissimilar or that the mix of products within each industry is essentially  the
same across countries.
* Emissions  are assumed to relate to output by an industry rather than, for instance, to
value added.  It is not obvious that this is an unreasonable assumption; the limited
availability of international data on value added prevented exploring sensitivity with
respect to this assumption.
Despite these limitations,  the evidence  presented  in this paper nonetheless  conveys  some
useful  preliminary  insights  about the implications  for toxic emissions  of the international  patterns
in manufacturing  production.
3.  The source of  data for manufacturing output is the United Nations Industrial Statistics
Yearbook. These data are deflated using the GDP deflator for each country since specific
deflators for each manufacturing  sector are generally not available.
4IIIntemristional Patterns  in Toxic Etnissions
This section  of the paper presents  a picture  of the international  distribution  of toxic
emissions  from manufacturing,  and of how this is changing  over time.
1. Patterns  across Countries
A cross-sectional  view  of 61 countries  in 1980  is depicted  in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
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The measure  on the vertical axis is pounds  of toxic emissions  per 1000  US 1987$  of GDP
in each  country.  Although  there is a good  deal  of dispersion  in this index  of toxic  emissions,  a
rough pattern  may be seen: emissions  first rise and then fall with income  per capita.  This is
brought  out quite  clearly  in a re,:-ssion of this same  index  (EG)  on both  income  per capita  (Y)
5and income per capita squared (Y2): 4
EG  =  1.l68  +  0.349 Y - 0.0139 Y2  No. obs.  61
(4.37)  (4.24)  (3.43)  Adj-R 2 0.18
F-Stat  7.75
According to this regression, the turning point is at an income of around 12,500 1987
US dollars in  1980.  Thus,  it is  only in  high income countries that rising incomes are
accompanied  by improving emissions per unit of GDP.
The inverted  U-shape  pattern observed  in manufacturing  emissions  relative to GDP might
have two separate causes: it might be first, a resuilt  of a pattern in the proportion of GDP
derived from manufacturing,  or second,  a result of changing  composition  within manufacturing.
To examine these possibilities, Figure 2 depicts the latter -- manufacturing  emissions per unit
of manufacturing  output graphed against income per capita for various countries in 1980.
No obvious inverted U-shape is discemible in Figure 2.  This is  confirmed by  the
following  regressions  in which EM refers to lbs of emissions  per 1000 1987 US dollars' worth
of manufacturing  output:
EM = 4.353 + 0.004 Y + 0.0021 Y2  No. obs.  66
(15.07)  (0.06)  (0.57)  Adj-R 2 0.01
F-Stat  1.46
EM  = 4.286 +  0.044 Y  No. obs.  66
(17.02)  (1.96)  Adj-R 2 0.03
F-Stat  2.77
Emissions relative to manufacturing  output rise significantly  with income levzis across
countries  (albeit with a great deal of variation  around this rising pattern)  and there is no evidence
that this rising pattern turns down.  In other words, the inverted-U  in manufacturing  emissions
relative to GDP appears to be largely a result of a decline in the value of manufacturing  output
4. Income per capita is rescaled to 1000 1987 US $. Figures in parentheses  are T-statistics for
a zero null-hypothesis.  Standard errors are computed  using the heteroskedasticity  robust method
suggested  by White (1980).
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relative to GDP amongst the highest income nations.
2.  Patterns across Time
How has the international  pattern of toxic emissions from manufacturing  shifted over
time?  To answer this question, annual observations on the logarithms of the two intensity
measures already considered --  intensity relatih  e  to  total  GDP  and  intensity relative  to
manufacturing  output -- are simply and separately regressed on time for each country. 5 The
resultant  estimated time trends for each country are graphed  against the logarithm  of income  per
capita in Figures 3A and 3B respectively.
5.  The period of observation as well as the number of observations differ from country to
country depending  upon data availability.  The mean number  of observations  available  in the case
of both indices is between 19 and 20. For  all countries the potential range of observation
considered is from 1960 through 1988.
7COUNTRY  TRENDS.  IN EMISSION  INTENSITIES
FIGUTRE  3.A
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8For the majority of countries  both trend growth rates are positive  --  emission intensities
have broadly risen over the last three decades in most countries. But  t is also apparent from
both portions of Figure 3 that emission intensities  have risen more rapidly in the lower income
nations. The significance  of this pattern is confirmed  in the regressions reported in Table 2.
Table 2  Toxic Release Intensity Trends Regressed Upon Income Per Capita
Emissions  Relative To
GDP  Manufacturing  Output
Intercept  0.151  0.023  0.068  0.009
(5.09)  (5.14)  (5.17)  (4.31)
Log(Income  per Capita)  -0.015  -0.007
(4.02)  (4.45)
I/Income per Capita  14.01  6.199
(3.43)  (2.50)
No. Obs.  51  51  59  59
Adj-R 2 0.32  0.35  0.32  0.26
F-Stat.  28.9  27.38  27.40  20.97
T-statistics in parentheses.
In particular, Table 2 expresses the trend in emissions,  relative to either manufacturing
output or GDP as a whole, first as a linear function of the natural logarithm of a country's
income per capita then as asymptotically  approaching  zero as income  per capita rises.  Each of
these four regressions demonstrates a  significant negative association between the trend in
emission intensities  and income per capita across countries.
III.  International  Trade and Emissions  Pattems
Why has the intensity of toxic emissions relative to production risen more quickly in
lower income countries? Why does the emission intensity of production rise (at least initially)
with income levels?  This section sketches a number of hypotheses, then offers some related
9evidence.
1.  Possible Hypotheses
(i! Private Comparative  Advantage
In the absence of binding controls  on the generation  of environmental  bads -- including
failure of private contractual  arrangements  to contain damaging  effects -- negative externalities
will result in over-production  and over-consumption  of environmentally  harmful commodities.
Free trade in such an unregulated  context results in a distribution  of production across countries
based  on comparative  private cost advantages  without  regard to environmental  costs: the capacity
or willingness  of nations to withstand  or accept environmental  damage does not enter the trade
calculus. The result is a distribution  of production and consumption  that is determined  without
regard for local or global environmental  consequences. Residents of some countries may be
comparatively  lucky, if the resultant production near their domicile happens to generate less
locally damaging effects, and if their fellow consumers  pick products which are less harmful.
As nations d- velop  the range of commodities  in which they have a private comparative
cost advantage, trade obviously shifts.  Shifts result from accumulating  capital available per
worker, from improvements  in the state of know-how  and worker skills, or from enhanced
identification  of -- or ability to exploit -- natural resources. The more rapid expansion  in toxic-
emission intensive  production  in lower income  countries  could consequently  reflect simple  shifts
in  world private cost advantages over  time --  shifts which coincidentally result in  greater
emissions being located in developing  countries.  Rising manufacturing  emission  intensity with
income may simply be a reflection of a shift toward comparative advantage  in manufacturing
generally, and of more capital intensive (smoke-stack)  industries, which also happen to be
pollution intensive, in particular.
(ii)  Environmental  Regulation
The standards required by environmental  regulations  vary substantially  across countries  -
- this, however, is not without some  justification.
(a) One reason different nations  will wish to impose  different standards  results from the
inequality in world incomes.  The desire for a cleaner environment is presumably a
10normal good, in the sense that demands for tighter standards rise with income.  Lower
income countries  would then be less concerned  to avoid local environmental  damage, as
indeed were the advanced nations at an earlier stage in their growth.
(b) A second reason to anticipate some difference in imposed standards stems from
variations  in capacity to withstand  environmental  damage. More sparsely  populated  areas
may conceivably  be less concerned to avoid specific kinds of pollution.  Being able to
locate industries with emissions harmful to humans far from densely populated areas,
presumably has its attractions.  Oii the other hand, certain sparsely populated regions
exhibit particularly fragile eco-systems  with a diminishing  capacity to withstand toxic
releases.
(c) A third reason for different standards  relates to variations  in enforcement  capacities.
Such  differences  may  rationalize  differences in. legislated  norms  and  help  in
understanding  gaps in enforced standards.
In principle, regulating environmental damage and taxing emissions can be used to
inteinalize the external costs stemming from pollution in its various forms.  To be effective,
these instruments must alter production costs and hence comparative cost advantage in trade.
If the externalities  inherent  in environmental  damage  are appropriately  contained,  then trade will
take place according to the social comparative  advantage  of nations, an advantage  defined by a
balance  of environmental  and other costs. But since both private costs and environmental  costs
differ from country to country, there is unlikely to be an even spatial distribution of toxic
emissions in an optimally regulated world.  Indeed, it is probable  that rising incomes may first
give rise  to  worse emission levels, as cost advantage shifts toward smoke-stack pollution
intensive industries, to be overtaken at higher income levels by electoral demands for a cleaner
environment  and perhaps enhanced capacity for enforcement.
(iii)  The Effects of Protectionism
Factor costs, know-how, natural resource base, capacity and willingness to withstand
environmental  damage, and ability to enforce regulations, all help define  the social comparative
advantage  of nations with respect to environmental  bads.  But the  world trading system is by
no means entirely molded  according to social comparative  advantage. Protectionism  is rampant
in developing  and better off economies  alike.  Whether the vagaries of this system are such as
to shift pollution-intensive  activities towards lower income economies, perhaps irrespective  of
11social comparative  advantage, is an open question of some importance.
2. Twards  Testing
Is the more rapid rise in emission intensities  in lower income countries  a result of more
rapid economic  growth or does it reflect some  other trend? Are there identifiable  breaks in this
trend and do these coincide with changing standards in richer nations? Is there any indication
that more pollution-intensive  activities are relocating  to countries  more capable of withstanding
the resultant damage?  What characterizes those Lountries which exhibit particularly high
emission intensities? And what role does protectionism  appear to play in this process?
Clearly some eco-systems  are far more fragile than others, but it is difficult to quantify
this meaningfully. Consequently,  rather than trying to address the broader question of whether
pollution intensive  activities  are relocating to more fragile environs, we begin by asking a much
simpler  question:  are emission  intensive  activities  concentrated  in less  populous  countries  (where
there may be less potential for damage to humans near emitting plants)?
The evidence  (see Figure 4) indicates that countries  with higher population  densities  have
no lower levels of emissions,  relative  to either GDP or manufacturing  output. An important  clue
to the identity  of countries  which do have abnormally  high emission  intensities,  derives from our
earlier observation  on the dominant  role of the industrial  chemicals  industries  in generating  toxic
emissions.  Which countries tend to have particularly large industrial chemical industries and
hence high emissions? The possession  of coal, oil or gas deposits  proves a key to understanding
the spatial distribution of Industrial Chemicals manufactures. This is reflected in Figure 5,
which shows the average toxic emissions from manufacturing  relative to GDP (top graph), and
relative to manufacturing  output (bottom gmph), for both producers and non-producers  of coal,
oil and gas. 6 Although the mere possession  and extraction of these raw chemical inputs does
not guarantee a country a comparative advantage in the down-stream  production of industrial
chemicals, the graphs make clear that countries producing  coal, oil and gas also
6. Data on coal, oil and gas production  are from the United  Nations  Energy Statistics  Yearbook.
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14possess relatively large industrial chemical industries and are consequently  estimated to have
high toxic emission rates.  Note, however, that the differences  in Figure 5.A are proportionally
greater than in 5.B.  In other words, only a part of the high manufacturing  emission rates
estimated for coal, oil and gas producers is due to the composition  of their manufacturing;  the
remainder  reflects a more important  role for manufacturing  as a proportion of GDP within coal-
oil-gas producer nations.
Another element likely to promote high levels of toxic emissions is the degree of
protection  offered to the most pollution-intensive  activities. Ideally one would  like to examine,
for the various countries over time, a measure of the effective protection granted to differing
industries in relation to the intensity of their pollution. 7 However, no compilation  of effective
rates of protection is readily available, even for a cross-section  of countries  at any one point in
time.
As noted in connection with Table 1, industrial chemicals are  the industry with the
highest toxic emissions relative to output.  Figure 6 plots, for each developing  country, total
manufacturing emissions --  relative to both GDP and manufacturing output --  against the
logarithm of total tariff and para-tariff rates on chemicals. 8
No obvious pattern emerges from the upper panel of Figure 6.  However, a positive
association may be discerned in the case of emissions relative to manufacturing  output.  (This
association is weakened  by the three countries with the highest intensities, each of which is an
oil producer -- a point to which we shall return shortly).  The significance of this positive
association  is confirmed and amplified by several regressions reported in Table 3.
7.  It  is well recognized, however, that even effective rates of protection have substantial
limitations  for inference with respect to resource allocation.
8. These measures  are extracted  from UNCTAD (1987).  Unweighted  average  tariffs are adopted
rather than trade weighted, since  the latter give zero weight  to highly protected  items effectively
excluded  from trade. This UNCTAD  publication  covers only the developing  countries. Note that
the tariffs refer to the average for all chemicals  rather than to industrial chemicals  specifically.
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16Table 3  LgTxic  Releases/  Manufacturing  Output)  Regressed  Upon Measures  of ImnQrt
Protection
Intercept  1.442  1.317  1.414  1.272  1.269  1.302  1.311  1.340
(25.1)  (19.1)  (23.6)  (18.6)  (8.37)  (6.17)  (9.05)  (6.66)
5'ariff on Chemicals  0.002  0.002
(3.35)  (2.34)
Tariff Chemicals/  0.295  0.276
Tariff on Manufactures  (2.70)  (2.43)
Log Tariff on Chemicals  0.084  0.113  0.054  0.080
(2.06)  (1.44)  (1.29)  (0.93)
Log  Tariff on Manufactures  -0.036  -0.031
(0.34)  (0.31)
Quotas on Chemicals  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002
(1.58)  (2.15)  (1.88)  (1.86)
No.  Obs.  36  36  36  36  34  34  34  34
Adj  R2  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.02  -0.01 0.03  0,01
F-Stat.  2.87  2.57  2.04  2.04  1.72  0.86  1.67  1.10
T-statistics in parentheses.
The regressions in Table 3 indicate a significant  positive association  between the level
of tariffs on chemical imports (or its logarithm)  and the intensity of estimated toxic emissions
relative to manufacturing  output. But does a high tariff on chemicals  tend to pull resources into
this sector if there is also high protection  elsewhere? A second set of specifications  in Table 3
looks at the role of tariffs on chemicals relative to average tariffs on all manufactured  goods;
again this finds a positive association. Finally the regressions in Table 3 include a measure of
the  incidence of  non-tariff trade barriers on  chemicals, with a  similar -- thouglh  perhaps
statistically  weaker -- result for the separate role of non-tariff trade barriers. 9 Overall there is
therefore some evidence to suggest  that developing  countries with greater protection offered to
their chemical sectors, suffer on average from a structure  of manufacturing  production biased
toward higher toxic emissions.  But there is also a great deal of noise in this average pattern,
9. The non-tariff trade barrier data are again taken from UNCTAD (1987). The measure is the
percentage of chemical  commodity codes subjected to a license, quota or prohibition.
17toxic emissions (though  it is difficult to distinguish  the separate  effects of the two instruments).
In the second set of regressions  in Table 4, an interaction  is introduced  between the coal-oil-gas
production dummy and the import protection measures.  There is a tendency for the import
protection measures on  chemicals to  encourage toxic  emissions both  among coal-oil-gas
-producers  and the remaining  nations; the import measures  have  a slightly more substantial  effect
on the non-producers.
As a final step in reviewing  this evidence,  the available  data on the various countries  over
time is pooled to estimate a fixed effects model including  a dummy variable for each country
in the sample.
In the first three regressions  in Table 5, the dependent  variable is the logarithm  of total
manufacturing toxic emissions relative to manufacturing  output, while in  the last two, the
dependent  variable  is the logarithm  of emissions  relative to GDP. The former set of regressions
include 80 dummy variables for the countries in the sample and consequently  no intercept is
reported, while the last two include 73 country dummies, owing to a more limited sample.
A positive time trend in emission intensities has already been noted from the simple
univariate  analyses  earlier in this paper.  However, a positive association  with income per capita
has also been noted. Is the time trend therefore  a result of rising incomes? The results in Table
5 suggest not.  Both a positive association  with income per capita and a positive time trend are
found. Indeed  a separate  time trend is estimated  for the periods 1960-73,  1974-79,  and 1980-88.
Despite major global changes, remarkably little change in time trend is observed over these
episodes.  In particular, there is no tendency for the rate of emission  intensity growth to slow
down; if anything, there is a very slight speeding  up in the growth of emission intensities.
The rising emission intensity relative to manufacturing  output shows no sign of turning
down at higher incomes.  In fact, if income per capita squared is included, as in the second
equation in Table 5, a positive relationship  is found. This is not the case for emission intensity
relative to total GDP where, as in the univariate  analyses, a significant  negative quadratic  term
is estimated.
19Table 5  Pooled Annual Data Across Countries: Fixed Effects Regressions
Dependent Variables: Logarithm (Toxic Emissions/ Manufacturing Output or GDP)
Toxic Emissions  Relative To:
Manufacturing Output  GDP
Time trend  9.206  9.901  27.396
(12.15)  (12.21)  (17.94)
Trend:  1960-73  4.598  17.895
(3.04)  (6.03)
1974-79  4.629  17.982
(3.07)  (6.08)
1980-88  4.637  17.973
(3.09)  (6.10)
Income per capita  0.886  0.666  0.870  2.483  2.310
(4.06)  (2.82)  (3.99)  (5.76)  (5.38)
Income squared  0.001  -0.001  -0.001
(2.39)  (2.66)  (2.50)
Income *  Trend  -0.450  -0.350  -0.442  -1.260  -1.173
(4.11)  (2.98)  (4.03)  (5.89)  (5.51)
No. country dummies  80  80  80  73  73
No. observations  1517  1517  1517  1395  1395
R squared  0.79  0.79  0.80  0.93  0.93
T-statistics in parentheses.
From the separate country time trend estimates  depicted in Figure 3, a pattern of more
rapid rise in emission intensities  among lower income countries is seen. In the regressions in
Table 5,  the statistical significance of  this pattern is  confirmed; a  negative coefficient is
estimated on the interaction  between time trend and income per capita, for both measures of
intensity.
A fixed effects model cannot be estimated so as to include our protection measures for
developing countries, since at this juncture only one observation  on protection is available for
each country -- these effects are then fully absorbed in the individual  country dummies. The
20Table  6  Pooled-Annual  Data Across  Developing  -Countries:  Fixed Effect_Regressions
Dependent  Variable: Logarithm (T.  xic Emissions/  Manufacturing  Output)
Intercept  -14.646  -14.747
(4.76)  (4.93)
Time  trend  8.859  8.109  g.126
(7.58)  (5.20)  (5.37)
Income  per capita  0.432  0.124  -0.047
(0.65)  (0.15)  (0.06)
Income * Trend  -0.215  0.061  0.024
(0.63)  (0.15)  (0.06)
Tariff  on chemicals  0.002  0.001
(5.22)  (3.23)
Quota  on chemicals  0.001  0.001
(1.77)  (1.27)
Coal-oil-gas  producer  0.146
(6.88)
No. country  dummies  43  0  0
No. observations  770  770  770
R squared  0.61  0.08  0.14
T-statistics  in parentheses.
same  is true  for any simple  representation  of whether  each  country  is a coal, oil or gas producer.
Table 6 therefore  reports  estimates  of pooled  cross-country  time series regressions,  including
these LDC data, but omitting  the country  dummies. For reference,  a fixed  effects  regression
with  country  dummies  for the 43 developing  countries  in the sample  is reported  first.
A positive  time trend  in emission  intensity  is again  estimated  for developing  countries.
However,  within  the range of incomes  over which  the developing  countries  are defined,  the
profile of emissions  against  income  is flat.  Nor is there evidence  to suggest  that the lowest
income  developing  countries  have  experienced  any more  rapid  increase  in emission  intensity  than
21the somewhat  better off developing  countries.
As with the univariate  analyses, the final columns  in Table 6 confirm that the coal-oil-gas
producing nations do indeed exhibit a significantly  greater estimated  rate of emissions  per unit
of manufacturing  output.  Moreover, the coefficients  on the rate of import duty on chemicals
and on the percentage of chemical imports subjected  to non-tariff  barriers, again prove positive
(although, in the case of non-tariff barriers, only weakly so in statistical  terms).  The positive
association  between  protecting  one's chemical  industry  and toxic emissions  is not merely  a result
of patterns in income per capita across developing  countries.
IV.  Summing-up  and Some Reflections
This simple  analysis  of manufacturing  toxic emission  intensities,  through time and across
countries, based upon fixed coefficients of emissions, has revealed a number of interesting
patterns:
* The estimated rate of manufacturing  toxic emissions relative to overall GDP, initially
rises with income per capita, but eventually turns down, although not until quite high
income levels are achieved. However, this inverted U-pattern is driven entirely by an
initial rise, then fall, in manufacturing  output relative to total GDP.  The composition  of
manufacturing  becomes  increasingly  toxic intensive  at higher incomes  (though  the profile
is quite flat within the low income countries), and shows no sign of turning down at
higher incomes.  Of course, this pattern may be mitigated  to some extent if the higher
income  countries  possess  or enforce technologies  which  are less emission  intensive  within
given industry groups -- this cannot be detected with our data. But the onus is on the
higher income countries  to contain the emissions  of their increasingly  pollution-oriented
mix of manufacturing  industries.
* The global trend has been toward a pattern of production which is increasingly
emission  intensive, both in relation to manufacturing  itself and more generally  in relation
to GDP.  Moreover, this trend has been remarkably constant across the last three
decades, and in particular there is no sign of a  slowing in  the trend toward more
pollution intensive manufacturing  activities.
* The upward trend in emission-intensity  of manufacturing  production has been faster
among lower income nations. If pollution restraints  on given industries  are progressing
more rapidly among the wealthier  countries, then this disparity would be even sharper
than our data suggest.
22* Among developing  countries, those which are producers of coal, crude oil or natural
gas also possess manufacturing sectors which are  more pollution intensive.  This is
because these countries  have developed  industrial  chemical  production  based  on their raw
materials.  It may be doubted that the fostering of such industries always reflects a
comparative  advantage:  the major advantage  in local, downstream,  very capital-intensive
processing  of raw materials,  really st, ms from contexts  in which transport  costs for crude
materials are very high, but for processed products are not.  In fact, petro-chemical
industries in the coal-oil-gas producing countries are often the result of  substantial
protection or effective.  subsidies.
* Among developing countries -- whether producers  of coal, oil, gas or none of these --
import protection stimulates  a larger industrial chemicals  industry and results in greater
emission  intensity  of manufacturing. The effects  of a general trade liberalization  cannot,
of course, be discerned from this. But at least the results suggest that less protection
offered to the local industrial chemical  industries would improve the pollution  intensity
of the typical LDC's industry.
At a minimum, the evidence indicates  that the emission  intensity  of LDC manufacturing
has been growing significantly  more rapidly than the intensity within industrialized  nations. In
this sense, there has been a tendency  to shift production  of the pollution  intensive activities  off-
shore.  Is this a bad thing?
If relocation  of industries  removed  them from close proximity  to people, the potential  for
human damage would clearly be diminished.  But there is no evidence to suggest that the
pollution intensive activities are settled in less densely  populated countries.
Even if  those developing countries whose manufacturing is rapidly becoming more
emission intensive, are  not better placed to  absorb these emissions physically, because of
removal from people or perhaps less fragile ecosystems,  it may nonetheless  be in their interest
to accept relocation of these industries. The jobs, income  and foreign  exchange  generated  could
be worth the environmental cost to the countries in question -- given their present level of
income. But the most pollution intensive  manufacturing  industries  are very capital intensive  and
hence generate very few  jobs; they are commonly  heavily  protected in the developing  countries
and probably not efficient sources of foreign  exchange.
Moreover, even if the acceptance  of such industries  is in the interests of certain  individual
countries, there  is the  more complex question of global consequences.  Our data do  not
distinguish  between globally and locally  damaging  emissions; the mere relocation of industries
23which emit globally damaging tox-is clearly misses  the point.
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